Apology Not Accepted: Disclosure of Medical Errors and Legal Liability by Szostak, David C.
DePaul Journal of Health Care Law 
Volume 13 
Issue 3 Summer 2011 Article 4 
October 2015 
Apology Not Accepted: Disclosure of Medical Errors and Legal 
Liability 
David C. Szostak 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl 
Recommended Citation 
David C. Szostak, Apology Not Accepted: Disclosure of Medical Errors and Legal Liability, 13 DePaul J. 
Health Care L. 367 (2011) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/jhcl/vol13/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Journal of Health Care Law by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more 
information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
APOLOGY NOT ACCEPTED: DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL
ERRORS AND LEGAL LIABILITY
By: David C. Szostak*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the long-gone era of the generalized family physician that made
house calls, people built a relationship with their doctors; trust and honesty
between patient and physician were common. In more modem times,
however, the health care industry has dramatically specialized and
diversified, leaving patients often feeling alienated and distanced from any
particular medical professional. Such a climate has taken a toll on trust
and honesty as both patients and medical staff feel less connected to each
other: patients, for example, are more likely to sue a faceless hospital than
an individual, friendly physician, and the physicians, in turn, are more
likely to hide information and conceal the truth because they fear lawsuits.
Nevertheless, recent trends in policies regarding disclosure of medical
errors have begun to swing the pendulum in the opposite direction once
again: an ever-growing number of hospitals and doctors support full
disclosure of medical mistakes to patients, and though it is still a
controversial topic within the medical community, the profession is
increasingly receptive to the idea. The public, by contrast, has long
supported disclosure with near unanimity.
The U.S. health care system makes an alarmingly large number of
medical errors: the infamous study that the Institute of Medicine of the
National Academies published in 1999 found that medical errors kill
between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans each year. The effect of medical
errors on the staff, sometimes known as the second victim problem, is
almost equally disturbing. When physicians or nurses commit errors, it
often results in negative emotions, such as remorse, guilt, feelings of
inadequacy or frustration.' As a result of committing errors, eighty-one
percent of physicians say that they increase attention to detail, but only
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five percent increase their use of evidence-based medicine.2  Self-
perceived medical errors are common among residents and are associated
with substantial personal distress. This distress is associated with
increased odds of future self-perceived errors, suggesting a cyclical pattern
of negative feelings and errors, each fueling the other.' Another
contributor to errors is sleep deprivation, which can impair medical and
surgical performance. Nursing fatigue and workload have documented
effects on increasing intensive care unit error, infections, and cost.4 Sleep
loss results in higher levels of stress and depression, more complaints
about bodily pain, and especially more motor vehicle crashes.' Nurses
also make more medical errors when they work in a hospital with a higher
patient-to-nurse ratio; their workload is overwhelming. In such hospitals,
surgical patients experience higher thirty-day mortality and failure-to-
rescue rates, and nurses are more likely to experience burnout and job
dissatisfaction.' All of these statistics are disastrous for patients.
II. DISCLOSURE OF MEDICAL ERRORS TO PATIENTS
The situation is dire, and much medical and ethical literature has
focused on the controversial topic of disclosing medical errors to patients
and their families. Studies have generally found that patients want to learn
about all errors, regardless of their severity: they want to learn how and
why the mistake happened, and they are concerned about preventive
measures that the hospital will take in the future to ensure that such a
mistake does not happen to anybody else.7 Patients also want emotional
support after being injured.' So what do hospitals, nurses, and doctors
actually do? Health care providers do not always reveal errors, mostly
because of their fear of litigation and damage to their reputations.' The
vast majority of hospitals disclose harm at least sometimes, but only one-
2. Id.
3. Colin West et al., Association of Perceived Medical Errors With Resident Distress and Empathy, 296(9)
J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1071, 1074 (2006).
4. Vicki Montgomery, Effect of fatigue, workload, and environment on patient safety in the pediatric
intensive care unit, 8(2) Pediatric Crit. Care Med. Sll, S13-S14 (2007).
5. Sigrid Veasey et al., Sleep Loss and Fatigue in Residency Training: A Reappraisal, 288(9) J. Am. Med.
Ass'n 1116,1117 (2002).
6. Linda Aiken et al., Hospital Nurse Staffing and Patient Mortality, Nurse Burnout, and Job
Dissatisfaction, 288(16) J. Am. Med. Ass'n 1987, 1990 (2002).
7. Juliana Wilson & Ruth McCaffrey, Disclosure of Medical Errors to Patients, 14(5) Medsurg Nursing
319, 321 (2005).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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third of hospitals have board-approved policies in place."o More than half
of hospitals would always disclose a death or serious injury." This of
course begs the question: what are the rest of the hospitals doing in these
situations?
Furthermore, when given clinical scenarios, medical professionals are
much less likely to disclose preventable harm than non-preventable harm
of the same severity.'2 Other research has focused on what hospital staff
actually knows about disclosure and how well it has been trained in this
respect. For example, in a study on incident-reporting systems, most staff
knew that their hospital had such a system, but thirty percent of
respondents did not know how to find a list of reportable incidents."
Moreover, views on the necessity of reporting different incidents vary
considerably." Ironically, even though medical personnel are reluctant to
disclose errors for fear of getting sued, full disclosure might actually
reduce litigation while creating trust and satisfaction in patients."
Interestingly, house staff uses a variety of psychological mechanisms
to deny or defend its errors. First, it denies that so-called "errors" even
take place by pointing out that doctors are not perfect, and the medical
field has a lot of "grey areas."" How can patients expect a physician to be
flawless when neither current medical knowledge nor technology is ideal?
Other doctors repress the errors, admitting they have probably made
mistakes in the past, but claim to be unable to recall any specific situation.
Another denial technique is to redefine the word "mistake," so that when
asked whether they have ever made a mistake that has harmed a patient in
any way, doctors may reply that they have never killed anybody or done
anything catastrophic." Physicians also discount errors, externalizing the
blame and placing it on someone or something else - the fault lies with the
bureaucracy at the hospital, the incompetent subordinates, the superiors, or
even the patient herself A physician's common response to an undeniable
error is that the treatment or procedure would have normally worked on
most patients, but this particular patient is unusual and something
10. Rae Lamb et al., Hospital Disclosure Practices: Results of a National Survey, 22(2) Health Aff. 73, 75
(2003).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 77.
13. Charles Vincent et al., Reasons for not reporting adverse incidents: an empirical study, 5(1) 1. of Eval.
in Clinical Prac. 13, 16 (1998).
14. Id.
15. Wilson, supra note 7.
16. Terry Mizrahi, Managing Medical Mistakes: Ideology, Insularity and Accountability among Internists-
in-Training, 19(2) Soc. Sci. Med. 135, 137 (1984).
17. Id. at 138.
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unexpected happened."
When a doctor can neither deny nor discount that she has made an
error, she may use distancing techniques such as asserting that it could not
be helped and everyone makes mistakes, confusing the uncertainty of the
collective medical profession with her own uncertainty. 9 Doctors may not
even realize that they are doing this, but they rarely take direct, full
responsibility for injuring a patient even within their own minds, making it
far less likely they would disclose medical errors to patients.
The situation is thus complex, and a number of studies have been
conducted to ascertain opinion both in the general public and in the
medical community. Regardless of severity, patients want to be informed
of any errors, and patients are less likely to sue if the doctor discloses the
error than they would be if the error is discovered by other means.20 A
widespread concern about medical errors exists in public opinion polls as
well as among doctors, but only a fraction of doctors believe that the
problem is really as serious as the public thinks.2' Whether the situation in
American hospitals is a mere troublesome predicament or an urgent crisis,
patients will respond more favorably to physicians who fully disclose
medical errors. In some cases, of course, patients will sue despite full
disclosure; in most cases, however, disclosing either has no effect or has a
net positive effect.22 In the end, as common sense would dictate, patients
simply do not want to be deceived.
For physicians, it is not so easy. Terminally ill patients, for example,
often request that their doctors prognosticate and give them survival
estimates, in months or years. In one study, doctors only gave an honest
estimate thirty-seven percent of the time - the other times they consciously
underestimate or overestimate.23 Physicians frequently have to make such
predictions, and they feel poorly prepared to do so. They find it stressful
and think that patients expect too much certainty.24 So what factors help or
impede physicians' willingness to disclose their harmful mistakes? A
18. Id. at 139.
19. Id. at 140.
20. Cherri Hobgood et al., Parental Preferences for Error Disclosure, Reporting, and Legal Action After
Medical Error in the Care of Their Children, 116(6) Pediatrics 1276, 1282 (2005).
21. Andrew Robinson et al., Physician and Public Opinions on Quality of Health Care and the Problem of
Medical Errors, 162 Arch. Intern. Med., 2186, 2188 (2002).
22. Kathleen Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views about Disclosure of Medical Errors, 140(6) Ann.
Intern. Med. 409, 414 (2004).
23. Elizabeth Lamont & Nicholas A. Christakis, Prognostic Disclosure to Patients with Cancer near the
End ofLife, 134 Ann. Intern. Med. 1096, 1099-1100 (2001).
24. Nicholas A. Christakis, Attitude and Self-reported Practice Regarding Prognostication in a National
Sample of Internists, 158 Arch. Intern. Med. 2389, 2391-92 (1998).
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feeling of responsibility is what primarily facilitates disclosure:
responsibility to the patient, to themselves, to the profession, and to the
community. On the other hand, various factors impede disclosure:
attitudinal barriers, uncertainties, a feeling of helplessness, and fears or
anxieties.26
III. LEGAL LIABILITY
These fears include the fear of getting sued, which is probably the
largest reason that hospitals and doctors will not disclose errors and take
full responsibility for them. Patients, however, are not solely - or even
primarily - seeking money when they are injured by a doctor's negligence.
Investigating people's reasons for suing doctors, one study found that
patients file a claim not only because of the original injury, but also
because of subsequent insensitive handling of the incident and poor
communication after it occurs. Less than fifteen percent of patients who
received an explanation found it to be satisfactory.27 Overall, four themes
emerged as to why people sue: first, patients are concerned with the
standard of care in the future - will other people be injured? What steps
are being taken by the hospital to prevent such a mistake from occurring
again? Second, patients genuinely want an adequate explanation of what
happened and why. Third, they do want compensation, but typically only
for their injuries and medical bills, lost wages, and other similar expenses
- not necessarily anything excessive or punitive. And lastly, patients
desire accountability - they want a nurse, physician, or some other
individual to step up and admit responsibility for what happened.2 8 Here,
patients also want an apology, and the importance of the words "I'm
sorry" to an injured patient cannot be emphasized enough.
Whether an apology is an admission of guilt and acceptance of
financial responsibility for all consequences is a question that divides
lawyers as well as doctors. Some lawyers say that apologizing for a
medical error is an admission of guilt, while others disagree." In one
situation, a surgeon apologized after a serious infection emerged near the
patient's surgery site, prematurely confessing, "We must have done
25. Lauris Kaldjian et al., An Empirically Derived Taxonomy of Factors Affecting Physicians' Willingness
to Disclose Medical Errors, 21(9) J. Gen. Intern. Med. 942, 945 (2006).
26. Id. at 946.
27. Charles Vincent et al., Why do people sue doctors? A study of patients and relatives taking legal
action, 343 The Lancet 1609, 1611 (1994).
28. Id.
29. Lola Butcher, Lawyers Say 'Sorry' May Sink You in Court, 32(2) Physician Executive 20, 20-21
(2006).
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something wrong. I'm sorry." Later, an infectious disease specialist
determined that the infection had been present before the surgery even
took place, but the jury sided with the patient because of the surgeon's
early apology. The jurors were actually polled after the trial, and they
admitted that they were sympathetic to the surgeon's situation but found
his remark more convincing than anything the expert witness said.30 An
apology evidently can, for legal purposes, be tantamount to an admission
of guilt that has far-reaching repercussions. This makes full and honest
disclosure difficult, if not impossible.
Disclosure of medical mistakes presents a conundrum. If doctors
refuse to disclose, then the relationship between physician and patient
suffers from a lack of trust and openness. If doctors do decide to disclose,
then they open themselves up to legal liability. The number of medical
malpractice lawsuits over the past half century has dramatically increased:
in the 1950s, one claim was filed per hundred doctors in a year, whereas
ten claims were filed per hundred doctors in the 1990s."' At the same
time, however, the number of medical mistakes documented has
skyrocketed: when disabling injuries occur during hospitalizations, one in
four of these injuries is due to provider negligence.32 Injuries due to
hospital staffs negligence are outstripping the number of medical
malpractice claims filed at a rate of at least three to one, if not higher.
Mistakes are commonplace, and health care providers face many obstacles
against disclosing: not only must they deal with malpractice insurance, but
a professional physician or nurse may damage her reputation or even lose
her job.
IV. PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
(PPACA)
The health care reform legislation that Congress passed last year
attempts to remedy the problem of widespread medical errors. On March
23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA).3 4 This legislation is incredibly
complex and contains a plethora of changes to existing law, such as
prohibiting health insurers from denying coverage based on pre-existing
30. Id. at 22.
31. Paul C. Weiler, The Case for No-Fault Medical Liability, 52 Md. L. Rev. 908, 912 (1993).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 912-13.
34. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("PPACA"), 124 Stat. 119-1025 (2010), available at
http://docs.house.gov/energycommerce/ppacacon.pdf.
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conditions, and prohibiting them from imposing annual or lifetime dollar
maximums on coverage. Some changes to the law took effect
immediately, while many others will not actually occur for several years.
Particularly relevant here, however, are the provisions through which the
federal government will use the Medicare and Medicaid programs to
decrease funding to hospitals where too many patients acquire infections
or other deleterious conditions because of avoidable medical errors.
Medicaid provides assistance to certain low-income individuals, as
well as disabled people, pregnant women, and children, among other
groups. Medicaid, of course, is a joint federal and state program; that is,
the federal government funds part of Medicaid costs, while states
administer the program and are required to pick up part of the tab, as
well." As of July 1, 2011, PPACA will prohibit federal payments to states
for Medicaid services related to certain hospital-acquired infections.36
Thus, with this legislation, the federal government is using its spending
power through Medicaid to give hospitals an incentive to implement safer
policies and procedures, with the admirable goal of reducing unnecessary
infections.
After several years, the health care bill will go further by doing
something similar with Medicare spending. Medicare is a completely
federally funded and administered program, assisting people age 65 and
older, as well as some disabled people under 65." In 2014 (to be
implemented in FY 2015), PPACA will reduce Medicare payments to
certain hospitals by 1 percent because of patients receiving certain
hospital-acquired conditions." These conditions include errors like
foreign objects being left in a patient after surgery, air embolisms, blood
incompatibility, and surgical site infections." Once again, the federal
government here is simply attempting to reduce medical errors in hospitals
through its spending power.
One final provision addresses the problem from a slightly different
direction. Just over a year from now, on Oct. 1, 2012, PPACA will reduce
Medicare payments that would otherwise be made to hospitals to account
35. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicaid Program - General Information, available at
http://www.cms.gov/MedicaidGeninfol.
36. PPACA, supra note 34, at 229.
37. Medicare.gov, Medicare Eligibility, available at
http://www.medicare.gov/MedicareEligibility/home.asp.
38. PPACA, supra note 34, at 291.
39. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, Medicare - Hospital-Acquired Conditions, available at
https://www.cms.gov/HospitalAcqCond/06 Hospital-Acquired Conditions.asp.
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for excess (preventable) hospital readmissions.40 Here, in a similar manner
as before, the legislation penalizes hospitals for making too many medical
errors. Hospitals will be forced - or at least given a strong incentive - to
develop new and better policies to prevent unnecessary readmissions.
Patient safety will thus be increased.
In light of these provisions, several things are clear. The Affordable
Care Act does not directly address the issue of disclosure of medical errors
in hospitals. It neither mandates nor even tries to regulate disclosure.
What the Act does do is recognize that a widespread problem exists, and it
tries to decrease these errors through spending incentives. Open and
honest disclosure of mistakes, as a policy matter, is ultimately left in the
hands of individual hospitals, but the hope is evidently that hospitals will
choose to implement disclosure as one way to help reduce medical errors.
V. WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
The consensus seems to be in favor of disclosure, but actually
implementing such a policy is riddled with problems and obstacles that
will not disappear until something drastic happens. Perhaps legislatures
and courts should require that physicians disclose errors: patients can
already sue for negligence, but the penalties may need to be increased for
physicians who are found guilty of negligence and did not disclose their
mistake to the patient - i.e., punitive damages may be necessary. A
different and preferable way to view such a system is that it rewards
physicians who disclose all mistakes at an early point in time. Such a
scheme would be comparable to how criminals can get a lesser punishment
by pleading guilty at the outset and avoiding trial, which is both costly and
time-consuming for the judicial system.
Alternatively, perhaps physicians who disclose medical mistakes to
their patients should be granted total immunity from any lawsuits for
negligence. There is substantial support for a "no-fault" compensation
system, which would replace the current individually-oriented "shame and
blame" tort system for medical malpractice with no-fault institutional
liability. This would seem to have the adverse effect of removing
incentives for health care providers to be careful, yet physicians do not
perceive the fault-based malpractice system to improve quality of care.
Several other countries have implemented no-fault liability systems,
particularly Scandinavian countries, with substantial success.4 Avoiding
40. PPACA, supra note 34, at 328.
41. David M. Studdert & Troyen A Brennan, No-Fault Compensation for Medical Injuries: The Prospect
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medical mistakes in the first place is the most important aspect of these
systems: when the hospital or health plan is responsible for the actions of
all its affiliated employees and staff, it tends to take steps to prevent any
harm from occurring.4 In effect, this is a system of respondeat superior:
the hospital, vicariously liable for its staff, will take steps to more carefully
screen and hire excellent physicians and nurses, and it will continuously
train them well to ensure that errors are minimized and that quality of
patient care remains high. Furthermore, patients could choose a
participating hospital or physician, allowing for market forces to drive the
no-fault liability system. 43
The objections to the current system of tort law for compensating
patients for medical mistakes are not only coming from the medical
profession: the legal community, too, does not necessarily believe that tort
law actually deters hospital staff from making mistakes. Many leading tort
law scholars have challenged economists' claims about the ability of tort
law to deter." Other forces, such as morality or self-interest, may act upon
staff to deter certain harmful conduct. Physicians may feel bound by their
morals and their professional oath to "do no harm" to patients. Similarly,
even assuming the more cynical view that health care providers are only
interested in their own well-being, damage to their reputations may be a
sufficient incentive for them to avoid making mistakes and causing
injuries. 45
Furthermore, even if other forces were not sufficient, it does not
logically follow that tort law is sufficient to deter harmful conduct.
Physicians may not be aware of the legal significance of a certain decision,
or they may discount the chance of future liability.46 It is by no means
certain that tort law is the optimal way to address the widespread problem
of medical mistakes in America, for purposes of compensation or even for
deterrence. What factors actually do influence physicians' standards of
care? A Harvard survey found that physicians consider continuing
medical education to be the single most influential factor on their
behavior, scoring 3.73 on a scale from I to 5; financial liability was rated
2.54.4 This demonstrates that, at least according to physicians'
for Error Prevention, 286(2) J. Am. Med. Ass'n 217, 219 (2001).
42. Id. at 219-20,
43. Id. at 222.
44. Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter? 42
UCLA L. Rev. 377, 381-82 (1994).
45. Id. at 382.
46. Id. at 382-83.
47. Id. at401.
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perceptions, liability does play a role, but other factors are more
influential. Perhaps one effective alternative to tort law would be to
require more continuing medical education on the subject of medical
errors and how to prevent them.
Preventing mistakes from occurring in the first place should be a top
priority at every American hospital. Residents are working far too many
hours and are often performing at a suboptimal level; nurses are
understaffed and overwhelmed by huge workloads. No solution will be
perfect, no matter how draconian or creative, and the optimal answer may
be a combination of many different measures. Nevertheless, some
sweeping reforms need to be enacted as soon as possible because lives are
hanging in the balance - and reforms of this magnitude do not typically
come about absent an active citizenry. A single preventable death is
thoroughly unacceptable; hundreds of thousands of preventable deaths
betray the sad state of the supposedly finest health care system in the
world. The only thing more dismal would be a population too indifferent
to demand immediate and drastic changes.
376
